Dedicated research on ideology has proliferated over the last few decades. Many different disciplines and methodologies have sought to make a contribution, with the welcome consequence that specialist thinking about ideology is at a high-water mark of richness, diversity and theoretical sophistication. Yet, this proliferation of research has resulted in a fragmentation in the study of ideology, producing independent communities of scholars differentiated by geographical location and by disciplinary attachment. This review draws together research on ideology from several different disciplines on different sides of the Atlantic, in order to address three questions that appear to be of deep relevance to political scientists: (1) What do we mean by ideology? (2) How do we model ideology? (3) Why do people adopt the ideologies they do? In doing so, it argues that many important axes of debate cut across disciplinary and geographic boundaries, and points to a series of significant intellectual convergences that offer a framework for productive interdisciplinary engagement and integration.
The coverage of this piece is necessarily somewhat selective: rather than claiming to represent the entire field, our focus is on highlighting cross-cutting themes in the variety of contemporary research taking place in North America with that in Europe.
Further, this review is less focused on providing a historical perspective on the study of ideology and more focused on rethinking the cleavages that animate contemporary debates about ideology. We emphasise that our intention throughout is not to suggest that some single master theory of ideology is possible or desirable. Instead we believe that connecting points of tangency between academic communities will allow scholars to focus on unexplored theoretical lacunae and points of potential cooperation, and exploit the comparative strengths and weaknesses of different research approaches.
What do we mean by ideology?
It has become routine to note the extreme variety of meanings imputed to the term ideology in academic research, with McLellan describing it as "the most elusive concept in the whole of social science". 8 But the familiarity of this concern has tended to obscure how the conceptual terrain occupied by ideology in the social sciences and humanities has changed. Variance remains, but in recent decades disparate research streams have increasingly deployed similar understandings of ideology. We trace this convergence, and residual divergences, along three cleavages: the evaluative connotations ascribed to ideology, the degree of coherence seen as necessary in an ideology, and the types of ideational components which make up ideologies. 8 McLellan 1995, p. 1.
This debate became prominent in postwar US research which converged on a definition of ideology as a highly consistent set of ideas with fixed and well-defined relationships between them. This view, particularly associated with Converse, conceived ideologies as constraints on the organization of attitudes. 19 Subsequently, a well elaborated empirical literature developed to suggest that highly coherent political ideologies were more widespread amongst political elites than amongst mass publics.
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By contrast, European scholars broadly eschewed such moves and rarely assumed that ideologies needed be tightly constrained or consistent. In part this has reflected the influence of theorists working in intellectual history and sociology, who critiqued the quick conclusion of 'incoherence' applied by scholars to systems of historical or vernacular thought unlike their own, 21 a criticism echoed by some American scholars.
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Indeed, for Billig et al. and Freeden, contradictions and dilemmas are central to the trajectory of ideological development. 23 Many European scholars now suggest that ideological analysis needs to incorporate a focus on the full range of political thinking, not simply highly elaborated and well-considered elite doctrines. 24 These scholars caution that a narrower conception of ideology can reify the contingent ideological spectrum of American elite politics, draws too firm and dichotomous a distinction between the ideologically sophisticated elite and the purportedly unideological mass public, and risks 17 Geertz, 1964; Hamilton, 1987, p. 22; George, 1987, p. 15; Gerring, 1997, pp. 961, 974; Knight, 2006, pp. 619, 623 18 Luskin, 1987, pp.864-9 19 Converse, 1964 20 Luskin, 1987 Jennings, 1992; Knight, 2006, p. 623; Carmines and D'Amico, 2015, p. 207-211 21 Skinner, 1965; Boudon, 1989; Boudon, 1999; Skinner, 2002 22 Luskin, 1987 Ball, 1996; Hochschild, 2001, pp. 315-16 23 Billig et al. (1988) ; Freeden (1996, pp. 36-40) 24 Hall, 1996c, p. 36; Freeden, 2008; Finlayson, 2012, p. 751; Freeden, 2013a, p. 116 obscuring how a diverse range of ideologies can impact public political thinking even when they are not totally or self-consciously internalized.
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To a degree, however, this cross-Atlantic contrast has been eroded, with Jost's celebrated claim of an "end to the end of ideology" illustrating the rapidly shifting axes of debate in political psychology. 26 Both Rosenberg and Jost, Federico, and Napier significantly relax the need for ideologies to have logical coherence, emphasizing instead the psychological benefits of ideological attachment and the necessity of ideologies in providing subjective interpretations of the political world. 27 Other psychologists have further moved away from conceptualizing ideologies as purely "cognitive" objects, emphasizing the importance of emotional coherence which can exist in the absence of logical coherence -indeed, logical coherence is often compromised to maintain stable emotional links between concepts in an ideology. 28 And, whilst not always using the terminology of 'ideologies', numerous scholars in North America share the desire of European scholars to examine what Freeden terms "actual political thinking" 29 and
Finlayson calls "political ideas as they are found 'in the wild'". 30 The literature on social movements is one significant example. 31 Each of these trends has brought the mainstream North American study of ideology into far closer alignment with the intellectual commitments of European scholars.
The substance of ideologies
The North American move to expand the forms of ordinary thinking that count as 'ideologies' contributes to a broader question shared across communities on what is properly understood as the 'substance' of ideologies, i.e. the sorts of ideational components that actually comprise ideologies. Here there is something of an unspoken contrast between approaches which depict ideologies primarily as bundles of attitudes or values -the majority but not exclusive view amongst political scientists and some 25 Freeden, 2008, p. 197; Leader Maynard, 2013 , pp. 314-16 26 Jost, 2006 27 Rosenberg 1988 Jost, Federico and Napier, 2006, p. 309 28 Thagard and Kroon, 2008; Thagard 2012 29 Freeden 2008 , p. 197 30 Finlayson 2012 31 Wuthnow, 1989; Snow, 2004; Tarrow, 2013 for paring down the most restrictive criteria attached to ideology so as to leave a broadly encompassing concept that describes some manner of patterned and politically-orientated Hamilton, 1987; Gerring 1997; Knight 2006 42 Freeden, 2005 Jost, 2006; Boudon, 1999, p. 159; Finlayson, 2012 , pp. 752-3 43 Norval, 2000 316 44 Jost, 2006 , pp. 653-4 45 Luskin, 1987 
How should we model what people believe or think?
A second question faced by any approach to the study of ideology is how to actually represent or model the vast complexity and variety of actually existing systems of ideas, in both the process of analysis and the written outputs of research. There exists a basic divide between spatial and non-spatial approaches to this mapping of ideological content. 46 Luskin, 1987 , p. 862 47 Frazer, 2008 48 Jost, 2006 Sargent, 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph, 2009; Jacoby, 2009 49 Schwarzmantel, 1998, pp. 8-9; Freeden, 1996; Eccleshall et al., 1984 50 Cassels, 2002 Boudon, 1999 52 Freeden, 1998; Stanley, 2008 ideologies as interconnected networks of visually depictable symbols; and (ii) thick descriptive models, which engage in detailed prose discussion of the contents and nature of ideologies. Haidt, Graham, and Joseph, 2009; Rosenberg, 1988; Cohrs, 2012 political science, 64 and political theory and intellectual history 65 have raised a number of similar concerns.
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Many theorists accept that spatial approaches offer some utility to the study of ideology, but worry that such models -particularly unidimensional models -excessively oversimplify the actual diversity of real world belief-systems. Both psychologists and political scientists have argued that several prominent US ideologies (let alone those of other societies) are poorly captured on a left-right and especially liberal-conservative scale, notably libertarianism. 67 In fact, even the psychological underpinnings of libertarianism may be distinct, with suggestions that libertarians structure their ideology along far less affective terms, holding a belief system with fewer emotional components. 68 Other North American scholars have questioned the implicit bundling of conservatism and resistance to change in psychological theories of left-right orientation.
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In political science, Zaller argues against a one-dimensional characterization of ideological content, instead reframing ideology as a "constellation of related value dimensions". 70 At the same time, Zaller argues that individual scores on these different dimensions still tend to be at least moderately correlated and thus, while dimension specific measurements of attitudes are preferable, a one-dimensional left-right construct still captures a meaningful part of the variation in political beliefs. Even physiological critiques have been integrated into this debate; an fMRI study suggests at least three separate dimensions of political attitudes, each associated with neural activation in a different region of the brain: individualism in the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction, conservatism in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and radicalism in the ventral striatum and posterior cingulate.
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Others critique the way specific unidimensional models, such as the liberalconservative continuum widely deployed in North American scholarship, are not solely utilised in reference to a specific political context but often explicitly or implicitly chosen dimension -so that when the subjects do not provide the sets of beliefs presumed by analysts to be the natural definition of 'liberal' or 'conservative' or 'left' or 'right' this is taken to indicate that are thinking 'incoherently' or 'non-ideologically' rather than demonstrating that this dimensional model is failing to capture their actual political thinking. 73 More generally, specific unidimensional models encourage an insensitivity to cultural variance and temporal change in the dominant ideological space. In articulating such challenges to dimensional, and particularly unidimensional, models of ideology, groups on either side of the Atlantic are arguing in tandem, but rarely in dialogue, for more complex models. While stronger criticisms of spatial approaches to ideological thinking are most frequently associated with European scholars, there is a diversity of voices on both sides of the Atlantic. For example, in US psychology scholarship, the left-right distinction tends to be framed as a bipolar dimension, in that left-wing and right-wing positions are defined as opposing belief systems. 79 However, a critical position argues that that "left" and "right" ideological positions are better understood as bivariate: distinctive sets of beliefs that are not inherently opposite. This idea was first seriously advanced by Kerlinger who argued that ideologies were clusters 72 e.g. Napier, 2006, p. 310 73 Converse, 1964; Jacoby, 2009, pp. 547-7 ; see also : Rosenberg, 1988; , p. 316 74 Tetlock, 1984 Freeden, 1996, pp. 139-314; Hall, 1996c; Adams, 1998; Freeden, 2009 75 Hendrickson and Zaki, 2013 76 Jenco, 2013 Pan and Xu, 2015 77 Ayoob, 2009; Browers, 2013 78 Steger, 2008 , Steger, 2013 79 Federico, 2007 of attitudes that respond to sets of "criterial referents," understood as classes, categories or phenomenon in the world that trigger individual attitudinal judgments. 80 Other critics cast doubt on the appropriateness of thinking about ideologies within a spatial framework at all. For example, to Conover and Feldman ideologies are most important for their symbolic role. 81 They suggest we should treat ideologies as a political symbol, and focus on the social differentiation that ideological attachment provides. In this, they echo almost identical criticisms lobbied by European scholars.
Non-spatial approaches
A different approach to the representation of ideology eschews spatial heuristics. For analysts within political theory, intellectual history, discourse analysis, and qualitative political science, political psychology or sociology, ideologies are principally set apart by their substantive ideational content. This can take the form of complex and varying conceptual configurations, 82 distinct set of historically textured myths and signifiers, 83 notionally factual content 84 or idiosyncratic arguments and ways of deploying rhetorical devices. 85 Hall argues that in such approaches, "when we analyse an ideology in terms of its 'key concepts' we are really mapping the whole web of meanings, the discursive space, which these core ideas, working together, constitute as that ideology's 'regime of truth' -to borrow Foucault's metaphor." 86 Analysts committed to this sort of project focus on the detailed content of ideologies, arguing that far too much is lost by the reduction of the substantive content that describes ideologies actual characteristics to one or two numerical dimensions. Consequently, they prefer to model ideology through one of two alternative approaches, which we term 'thick description' or 'symbolic mapping'.
The dominant non-spatial approach to modelling ideology is thick description:
detailed prose discussion of the particular beliefs and arguments, discursive tendencies and rhetorical devices, or cognitive processes that define the character of particular 80 
From the group to individual in Europe
On the other hand, the European academy has typically adopted a more social or grouporiented approach, with an overwhelming focus on discourse and language as determinants of ideological attachment and change. European theorists are largely united in emphasising how perception of the social (and material) world is possible only via conceptual frameworks made available through discourse. Since discourses vary from one social context to another, discursive resources enable and constrain the forms of thinking which subjects are able to engage in. 128 Consequently, all political thought is governed by the nature of available political discourses: the particular concepts, rhetorical Simonds, 1989 , Shelby, 2004 128 Gramsci, 1971 Freeden, 1996, p. 57; Fairclough, 2001, p. 2; Wittgenstein, 2001; Skinner, 2002, pp. 8-26,44-46; Nafstad et al., 2007, pp. 317-18 individual, group or societal ideologies are therefore prompted by and reflected in changes in these constitutive discursive components. Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis, 2000; Zizek, 1994 136 Zizek, 1994 Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 4; Wodak and Meyer, 2009, pp. 15-16,27-31 137 Skinner 1965; Tully 1983; Freeden 1996; Hall 1996c; Norval 2000; Wodak and Meyer 2009; Fairclough 2010 . 138 Elster 1982; Boudon 1989 139 Boudon, 1989 , pp. 83-85 140 Boudon, 1989 , p. 117 141 Billig 1991 van Dijk 1998 are central to the approach of several post-structuralist theorists, including Zizek, Stavrakakis, and Glynos.
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Discussion: The future study of ideology
Research on ideology has never been as diverse or abundant as it is at present. The recent surge of work in political and social psychology in North America has supplemented an equally notable revival in political theory and sociology in Europe, itself preceded by enduring work in political science and intellectual history. But, as a consequence, research on ideology has also never been so fragmented. Despite the existence of common interests, convergence on a number of core assumptions, and complementary strengths and weaknesses, interdisciplinary volumes or references to work across disciplinary boundaries, and the Atlantic Ocean, are rare. 143 On all three core questions examined in this paper, theorists are missing critical possibilities for mutual support and inefficiently labouring over tasks from scratch that have been considered extensively by others.
To continue making significant advances, the field of ideological analysis must become more integrated. This is not to call for a single definitive 'theory of ideology'.
Some differences between disciplines over aims, methods and consequent expertise necessarily endure: political psychologists are always going to be better placed to investigate some questions than intellectual historians, political theorists or sociologists, and vice versa. Nor is this a call for all research on ideology to share a single, academic objective. Different approaches to the study of ideology will necessarily draw different types of conclusions from different facets of ideological behavior. But diverse scholarly communities can benefit from a mutual appreciation of each others' academic projects and a much more integrated dialogue. We conclude this review by considering the potential gains from such integration across all three of the questions that animated this review: (1) What do we mean by ideology? (2) How do we model ideology? (3) Why do people adopt the ideologies they do? Generally, we argue that there is the strongest existing convergence with respect to the first question, and the weakest with respect to the last question.
To date, the most significant integration across different approaches to ideology has been with respect to conceptualization. As we have shown, scholars with diverse theoretical commitments have gradually adopted converging definitions of ideology.
Importantly, this convergence has occurred even as different scholars maintain fundamentally different research objectives. It has not been a function of critical theorists, for instance, abandoning their constructivist epistemology or quantitative scholars abandoning their positivism. Instead, this convergence appears to have organically emerged in response to parallel research advances, and has done so without undermining the distinctiveness of each community's research paradigm.
This is a positive development, and a necessary condition for facilitating dialogue between isolated scholastic communities. Theorists should continue to encourage a general convergence towards a shared understanding of ideology as a non-pejorative and broad concept that refers to a diverse range of idea-systems influencing political and social thought and behaviour. As Gerring suggests, individual definitions may legitimately vary somewhat to suit individual research projects or methodologies. 144 But keeping, as far as possible, those definitions proximate to one another in a shared conceptual space encourages analyses of different sorts of idea-systems and worldviews to be formulated in tandem and dialogue, rather than in isolation. A broad and nonpejorative conception of ideology does not prevent critical analysis of ideologies, nor does it prevent us from deploying more specific 'subtype concepts' (rigid ideology, thin ideology, elite ideology and so forth) when more specificity is needed. Indeed, conceptual development here should be encouraged. We also think it critical for scholars to press ahead with the existing but incomplete trend of studying vernacular mass-public forms of political thinking, and conceptualizing them as 'ideological' even when they are messy, inchoate, latent, eclectic or hybridized belief-systems that diverge from the expected patterning of elite ideologies or traditional understandings of left-right or liberal-conservative ideological packages. 145 The contrasting practice of deeming public 144 Gerring 1997 , pp. 965-966 & 982-983 145 Snow, 2004 political thinking incoherent or unideological in light of unnecessarily narrow notions of what ideology 'should' look like undermines the empirical openness of research on public political thinking. It also significantly impairs the capacity of research on ideology to keep up with both cross-cultural variation and temporal change in the ideological landscapes of contemporary states. Where conceptual differences do remain between ideological analysts, it is important that they be clarified and navigated with consideration of the full scope of research on ideology, rather than presumptively or by offering justifications that speak only to an analyst's most proximate methodological cousins.
With respect to how scholars model ideology, we find persistent differences.
Diversity in the modelling of ideologies is to be welcomed, but the existing literature seems considerably below the optimal level of integration, multi-model usage, and exploration of novel modelling methods. Yet diverse literatures reveal much stronger parallels than other reviews have often assumed, and this suggests that greater integration is feasible and would make contemporary research richer and more precise in its capacity to conceptually grapple with different ideological positions. Conversely, the general failure of thick descriptive approaches to incorporate verifiable data on large-N samples of ideological attitudes represented in spatial models is curious, and renders much thick descriptive work, which is often admirably grounded in textual analysis of high intellectual discourse or media coverage, frustratingly untethered from measures of the attitudes of ordinary voters and citizens. This is particularly ironic given the increasing interest of theorists using thick descriptive modelling in studying the actual political thinking of ordinary people. 146 As this highlights, this call for modelling integration goes for the forms of data on which models are based as much as the expository models themselves. Non-spatial approaches are also weaker in their capacity to make relational comparisons between ideologies so as to ensure that individual ideologies are not studied in isolation. Spatialization and symbolization could thus enhance the power of thick descriptive approaches to provide precise differentiated accounts of the ideological topography in given political contexts. or the complementarity of psychological attention on threat and fear management with conclusions from biological research on ideological attachment, since the amygdala is believed to be involved in fear conditioning. 153 Again, though, social, political and institutional factors remain more marginal to these research efforts and need to be brought into cross-scale accounts of ideological positioning. Claims abut these factors need to be delivered in more specific terms that are sensitive to specific causal and theoretical pathways in order to fully advance our joint understanding of ideological change.
But asymmetry is equally visible in the more discourse-centric European academy.
Van Dijk offers an authentically "multidisciplinary" effort to study ideology, yet one which remains heavily focused on the discourse analytic methods with which van Dijk has most been associated. 154 Cognition and social institutions are incorporated into van Dijk's approach at the theoretical level, with considerable gains in causal and conceptual 149 Jost, Federico and Napier, 2013, p. 234 150 Edelman, 1977; Wuthnow, 1989; Balkin 1998; Snow, 2004; Tarrow, 2013. 151 Yet fragmentation of research along disciplinary and geographical lines has thus far stymied efforts to build genuinely holistic accounts of ideology. Instead, theorists work almost from scratch in theorizing phenomena like discourse or emotion, neglecting the much more extensive work that already exists in other disciplines on these topics.
In short, the literature on ideology still lacks a theory of ideology which incorporates: a) the individual genetic, physiological and psychological drivers that vary at the individual level and incline individuals towards or against certain ideas, and b) the political struggles, institutional relationships, social networks, discursive devices and 155 Freeden, 2013c 156 Norval, 2000, pp. 321,329-30; Leonardo, 2003 , p. 207 157 Freeden, 2008 . See also: Balkin, 1998 158 Hammack, 2008, p. 228 159 Haidt, Graham, and Joseph, 2009; Hammack, 2008 160 Freeden, 2013c semantic configurations that vary at the level of social context and present individuals with particular ideas and certain fields of ideological possibilities.
While explanations of ideological attachment and change are always going to reflect the expertise and foci of the analyst, we suggest that an integrative basic model could be formulated as a starting point for future research. Such a basic model could integrate existing knowledge of the individual and social causal mechanisms that shape ideologies more comprehensively. Individual determinants, as the literature surveyed here suggests, include psychological predispositions that motivate an individual to adopt certain ideological views, such as the epistemic, existential and relational motives described by Jost, Federico, and Napier, the drive towards epistemic satisfaction described by Boudon, the need to avoid cognitive dissonance famously identified by But such individual determinants operate under the influence of a wide range of social determinants. Individuals' personal cognitive resources are acquired primarily through social interaction and the learning of discursive resources -as these are internalised they enable, constrain and structure perception and reflection. 163 Social interaction also exposes individuals to the vast majority of actual descriptive and 161 Festinger 1957; Žižek, 1996; Boudon 1999; Glynos, 2001; Weber and Federico 2007; Napier 2013 162 van Dijk, 1998; Rosenberg, 1988 163 Freeden, 1996 Freeden, 2013a; van Dijk, 1998; van Dijk, 2013; Fairclough, 2010; Billig, 1991; Skinner, 2002; Wuthnow, 1989 descriptive and normative content, individuals are exposed to a range of discursive/rhetorical devices, such as frames and narratives, as well as participatory practices and rituals which can encourage certain ideological conceptions. 165 And just as critically, all individuals are socially positioned in a certain strategic context: an ideological environment defined by the live political issues, the existing distribution of ideologies, institutions and social networks, and the political and technological opportunities for certain forms of ideological production and interaction. This is, obviously, only a starting point in thinking about the multi-level interacting mechanisms behind ideological change, and we assume that further categories of causes at the individual and social level could be delineated. But the breadth of this brief taxonomy illustrates how far we are from fully understanding the interconnections between these various factors. Such understanding is a potential product of the broad field of ideological analysis and should be a core ambition of that field. But it will require theorists to cross disciplinary and continental boundaries in their efforts to attain it.
Even partial efforts to integrate ideology research in this way are ambitious. But a truly integrative effort to theorise ideology would still leave considerable room for
